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Introduction
We observe that the ideas of community and time in Agamben are strongly
linked. At the moment of thinking the community we consider inevitable its interaction
with the idea of time, in fact we see that such a correspondence is implicit in the thought
of community.
Nevertheless it is necessary to demonstrate the nucleus of this correlation, given
that it is not possible to talk about the community without referring to the time of the
subject. The subject is who does experiment the time and who is able to perceive the
own time and to assume it, and for whom to self recognize into the time is possible at
well as to experiment (it), to occupy (it) and to live (it) in common is.
In the present analysis we will see that the time, as a place for the experience, is
itself in the community. In fact, it becomes evident that the community is continuously
disclosing1 within the time in which it is. Moreover, the community produces an idea of
time that neither is related to a destiny nor is linked with an eventual delimitated future.
In this context the time is not only a subjective condition of the subject but it
deals with a practice both subjective and intersubjective. Because, at the moment of the
time experience, simultaneously occurs that the subject appropriates and communicates
it. By this way the community be-comes in the experience of the subject and belongs to
the now time of the occurring, where the singular be being and the common future are
conjugated.
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The community becoming 
Agamben stresses that the coming being is a whatever being. With this
affirmation. On one hand, Agamben highlights the value of whatever; and on the other
hand, brings out the place of the adjective quodlibet used by the Scholastic tradition in
the enumeration of the trascendentals, which Agamben translates as “the being that,
whatever it be, matters” (Agamben 1990 3): “quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu
perfectum, qualsivoglia ente è uno, vero, buono o perfetto” (3). Agamben begins from
affirming that whatever is the term that in spite of lying itself unthought conditions the
meaning of all the others. By putting the accent in whatever and pointing it as a
condition for everything beyond it, Agamben achieves a significant inversion in the
meaning.
Certainly, there exists a core issue that we will not specifically unravel here
which is the discussion between universals and particulars; we only mention that it is
possible to notice a correspondence between its translation and dialectic category. The
most usual sense of quodlibet adheres to the universal –see below– whilst “the being
that, whatever it is, matters” affects directly a particularity (singularity). 
Regarding the choice of drawing under the usage of quodlibet as “indistinct, no
matter which”, we observe that the key point assigning a different character to this term
likely is the meaning of matter. Hence we wonder about the consequence for a thing of
being important. Maybe the importance supposes that one thing is more transcendent or
has a different value than other? Or perhaps indicates the reflection of some quality?
Neither the first nor the second, because the importance of something is not a
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consequence of a comparison with another: it matters per se, because of being as it is
(Agamben 1990 3).
In fact, something matters, that is something is of importance. However, it is
striking that, as adjective, important is mostly used in a comparison. The importance of
something generally possesses more relevance according to overcome (the level/s of) the
others instead of what is the important thing itself. In addition, considering the ordinary
usage of whatever as a totality, as all-the-equally members of some species or
collection, the importance there indicates no importance of any each one. Say for
example that we are looking for a particular letter in a file drawer that contains hundreds
of similar letters and documents. Everything here seems the same. Whatever may be the
unique letter that we seek, we must open one by one each of the envelopes to find it.
What we try to illustrate is that assuming the existence of infinitely many similar things,
only one and not the other is what we need. So then, such a whatever (regardless which)
matters because it is this absolutely singular and no other. 
 Therefore we can conclude that whatever no matter which and whatever
matters definitively means different things. Whatever being is per se different from
whatever all of them; whatever being means, first of all, as Agamben says, whatever
singularity, and this is which makes it important itself (1990 3). Each of whatever
beings matters, the totality of whatever beings, insofar as whatever singulars. And this is
what we must keep in mind. Hence, we understand that the importance of whatever
being depends on being whatever singular. 
Whatever being is, in consequence, the picture of the pure singularity (Agamben
1990 45) Being this or that does not refer to a common property, neither it possess
identity nor is determined by any concept. Being such in-with does not take the
singularity from its indifference but obtains its singularity only by being how it is
(Agamben 1990 3). 
That said, we particularly want to think not only about singularity per se but also
about the appealing idea that it is in the whole originality of such (whatever) singular
being where its form finds the predicate. We consider that this singularity is, without
any doubts, a subject which constitutes itself in common, lives, and hence it is
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inseparable from its surrounding (Campero, Favre 2011). In addition, we notice an
ontological dimension in the singular aspect of this whatever being where both the self
and the non-self appear equally (i.e. with the same intensity) resignified. In other words,
just focused in the importance of the singular being we can highlight the meaning and
transcendence of the other as such. More importantly, now self and non-self are not
independent but are specifically and clearly differentiable.
Life is always in relation, it is in the vinculum and from the vinculum the way as
subject is. In this sense, Agamben’s whatever being is, in fact, the singularity of living
processes. Interestingly, quodlibet also means “who lives” or “who is living” (Restrepo
2009)2. Even when we will not analyze here the concept of life which in turn is a key
point in Agamben’s philosophy, we must mark that life is natural for subject (Lisciani
Petrini 149-151), since subjective developments are at same time living processes.
Moreover, dynamics of life configures subject’s form, the being of the subject. Then, we
can glimpse that in Agamben’s singularity, i.e. “whatever being matters”, appear
together revalorized the subject’s own, the not subject’s own and what is living in both
of them. As a consequence, and as a result of the equation between self and non-self in
relation, emerges the own experience. In fact, the subject recognizes and affirms the self
in relation to the non-self (Varela 541). 
So then, we can now say that the subjective experience occurs in the life but it is
necessary to understand that a play, a special relation between the part and the whole
exists, that is, between life and subject. Life conforms itself simultaneously as totality
from singularity, life is intrinsic to subject but subject is able to exclude from the whole
and distinguish itself. In fact, a living subject can know itself as a living being, and, at
the same time, as a part of life (Morin 232).
In the same way Agamben explains the logic of belonging. Agamben supports
that singularity is a part of a whole, however he makes clear that this belonging is not a
representation of a real circumstance but it represents that the singularity is only in
relation with an empty, undetermined totality (Agamben 1990 45). This indetermination
is, in other words, the field of all the possibilities to whom the subject is exposed to. 
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Therefore, there is not a general rule or collective identity but singularity, like
living subject, may be itself a reflection of the whole which it belongs. As clearly
explains Plonowska Ziarek (2011), singularity is then located in the area of potentiality
that it has multiple modes of indefinite existence. 
Thus we can see the merge of two concepts: the idea of a subject exposed from
itself to the other, and, at the same time, the notion of a shift in the essence of
singularity from what one is to what could be (Plonowska Ziarek). We now propose to
combine both ideas and talk from here on a whatever subject that is in-relation-to and to
which all life is intrinsic.
Continuing the analysis proposed we consider that for understanding which the
community that we are talking about is, it is significant to pay attention to the
connection between common and singular and essence and singularity. In this regard
Agamben elaborates on Spinoza’s argument (see below) about the irreconcilability in
what is common with what constitutes the essence of a singular thing, and he affirms the
emergency of an idea of unessential community: “Tutti i corpi, (Eth., 11, lemma II),
convengono in ciò, che essi esprimono l'attributo divino dell'estensione. Tuttavia (per la
prop. 37 ibzd.) ciò che è comune non può in nessun caso costituire l'essenza di una cosa
singolare. Decisiva è, qui, l'idea di una comunità inessenziale, di un convenire che non
concerne in alcun modo un'essenza.” (Agamben 1990 14)3
Historically community has been thought as a close and definite totality. In fact,
community has been conceived as a structure in accordance with some particularities
that distinguished it. From this point of view being in common is nothing but being
included under certain special properties, which also happens due to homogeneity exists
from the beginning through the proper rules of the logic of community. 
In Agamben we can see a deconstruction of the meaning of community and
because of this we observe that it transcends the balance of the norm by getting the
belonging off the positive and identitarian basis of community. In fact, Agamben defines
common as which is unidentified as such (1990 15)4.
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Community comes to break into the projected work, there is no previous
structure. The coming community announces without patience a place prior to form and
con-forms in the threshold of individuation, it is what is being while communicating. 
Therefore we arrives to the idea that common and community are
simultaneously, they occur at the same time in the full occurrence of relations. Common
and community appear in the indifference to the attribute and rise from which is in
continuous potency. So, we are convinced to say that being is then an experience that
takes place in the empty space outside the essence where common is exposed. 
Transforming time: the coming community
For opening this section we want to mention that in order to think community
without determinisms imposed by any structures, we must necessarily think it out of a
progressive lineal time. Thinking community as a becoming, the former will be neither
functional nor consequent to the dynamics of the law of cause and effect. So then it is
appealing to think about the proper time of community.
As we have recently seen, community is a singular-plural conformation in which
the (whatever) subject is mirrored (it can see itself there and outside community), as a
result what it is necessary is a time that could be transformed and be able to conformed
itself within the experience of the subject that is. 
First of all, we try to briefly survey Agamben’s elaboration on time in Time and
History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum5. In the mentioned work Agamben
depicts a critique of traditional (conservative) idea of history familiar with the ordinary
representation of time as punctual homogeneous continuum, and he highlights the
necessity of a thorough re-elaboration of the notion of time accompanying the goal of
changing and transforming the world (Agamben 1993 91-92).
In this connection he considers that circular continue time of Greco-Roman
Antiquity indicates perpetuity and recurrence. This conception of time with its circular
movements ensures repetition and continuous return. So we agree in that it is impossible
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for whatever subject to dominate time, on the contrary becomes a victim trying to
conquer it and watching it go by (Agamben 1993 92-93).
In turn, Christianity represents time as a straight line. Besides, for Christianity
the word is created in the time and must finish in the time, which it is impossible to
occur in a circular conception lack of all kind of beginning. The created world of
Christianity is then finite and limited, and it draws its history from the beginning until
its end on the basis of the existence of God, sovereign producer of all time. 
The modern conception of time constitutes the secularization of Christian time
rectilinear and irreversible. Modernity get out all reference to end and circumscribes
time to a structural process where the concepts of before and after are now represented
(Agamben 1993 96). This is how occurrence is converted in facts or events which
happen only once and irreplaceably. Time is periodized and by choosing a common
frame history is divided in selectively key moments which are distinguishable from
others that will never be known.
Finally Agamben claims the Gnostic notion of time that suggests it as incoherent
and not homogeneous (1993 101). He definitively supports the possibility of
experiencing this kind of time.
In conclusion we now feel compelled to say that the experiencing of time is the
concrete opportunity for whatever subject of linking life and action. Such experience put
time into the event of the self and makes visible the self in the proper time. Recognition
of one self in the time leads whatever subject to occupy it. 
A common time: of the whatever subject
As we have been seeing here and in agreement with studies by other authors
(Whyte 2010), Agamben makes possible a community of pure singularity by canceling
substantive identities. That is, in other words, a community consisting of
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identification-free singularities which remain open to the unlimited possibilities of being
in common (Ten Bos 2005 20). 
This is very important and indispensable when thinking about the subject’s time.
And it is because, as we said before, community is no longer the basis of subject. In
other terms, since there is no constraint belonging, i.e. a totality suppressing the one, the
experience of the subject takes place. Due to this inversion and having erased the
borders of origin and finality, the whatever subject gets the ability to recognize itself,
and, as well, to know itself in, which it is possible by making use of time. Living subject
employs time for itself, understanding and appropriating it. So bearing in mind that the
experience is the result of the one in relation to the other, the time of the subject and its
use is also the spontaneous representation of the time of common. At this point in our
analysis, we find especially important to note that time and community are constructible
and transformable, i.e. community and time of community emerge from this subject that
is being again and again. It is also appealing to consider that such notion of use is
associated to the idea of appropriation in that the possibility of subject to retain, in the
transit to common, what belongs to itself.
Albeit it can be clear, when we mention the transit we do not mean before and
after but we consider that it is always about a present moment which is constructed and
experienced. Therefore time specifically belongs to neither whatever subject nor
community but it is the product and exclusive consequence of communion between
both, and this is what the coming community is.
This transformation in the sense of temporality transpires community as a
reflection of the merely possible. We understand that community, free of anticipatory
marks and committed to common experience is the unnamed footprint of singularity. In
this regard, we cannot ignore that this idea of common time in which subject and time
are consubstantial brings us to some concepts proposed by Nancy in another paramount
work about community: The proper community, Nancy says, is nothing but
being-in-common that only occurs (Nancy 1990 238). 
In sum, we observe that whatever subject, by experientially using of time, leads
common and community to occur together from the subjective practice of being. Living
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subject, that in-relation-to, get out of itself –but knowing itself–, is multiplied
indefinitely (and indefinably) and becomes community. Community is then the integrity
of self distinguishable and undifferentiable in the common time in which is composed.
In other words, subject is only in community and community is nothing but the way of
being of the subject. The living subject appropriates time in its experience of being and
forms and conforms the community which concurrently gives sense to its being alive. 
This ontological view shows its extent when we can differentiate between
subjects that remain outside the community and subjects that, in the experience of being
living subjects, build the community. It is necessary to note that when subject is only
what bounds community misses the possibility of making a dialectic process of
subjective identification. Community imposes identity to subject; then, subject lays
implicitly subsumed under time and norms of community, without the ability of
developing its own individuality. In these circumstances, the subject requires to arrange
or fit in a pattern in order to be socially included-excluded. The subject is, in this
perspective, excluded (simultaneously) from its own life and the whole work of being
living is absolutely consumed by this tension subject-community. Relations depend on
the current structure of power, and power controls members of the community.6 
That said, we can observe that when community is equivalent, in its
conformation, to singular experiences of subjects, when the proper individual subjective
forms construct what it is common, hence, things change and subject –that abandons
outside urges– goes through all disjunctive tensions. Conversely, subject, owner of the
proper experience of living, gets an identity of itself, not under power norms but instead
from subjective relations, in the scenario of the difference and the commonness.7
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Notas
1 This means to uncover it, which is there, not completely hidden but invisible and
which becomes visible suddenly.
2 (The translation is ours).
3 Original translation of Spinoza by Agamben.
4 “Whatever is constituted not by the indifference of common nature with respect to
singularities, but by the indifference of the common and the proper, of the genus and the
species, of the essential and the accidental. Whatever is the thing with all its properties,
none of which, however, constitutes difference. In-difference with respect to properties
is what individuates and disseminates singularities, makes them lovable (quodlibetable).
Just as the right human word is neither the appropriation of what is common (language)
nor the communication of what is proper, so too the human face is neither the
individuation of a generic facies nor the universalization of singular traits: It is whatever
face, in which what belongs to common nature and what is proper are absolutely
indifferent” (Agamben 1990 15). [Translated by Hardt, Michel. 2007, 18-19].
5 In Infancy and History. The destruction of experience.
6 As a sake of example, Judith Butler during an interview by Beatriz Preciado answers
regarding the question of sexual identity and the idea of gender that she has always been
interested in studying how one acts in response to gender restrictive norms which
presuppose what a human being is. In fact, Butler argues that the first question when a
baby is born is ¿boy or girl? Butler establishes that we cannot be understood as human
beings unless that we first been understood as gender beings. Therefore, the norm of
gender becomes a requisite of human intelligibility (Soley-Beltran, Preciado 225). As
Preciado says, Butler has well defined gender as a system of rules, conventions, social
norms, and institutional practices that produce performatively the subject that want to
describe. Gender (femininity/masculinity), stresses Preciado, who intensively work on
this topic, is not a concept, nor an ideology, nor a performance: it consist of an
ecological politics… Gender works as an operative program by which sensitive
perceptions are produced taking form of affects, wills, actions, believings, identities
(Preciado 98).
7 So then, occurs that there is not male and female gender except of being in front of
people, that is, as a somato-discursive construction with collective attributes, in front of
(scientific) community (Preciado 100).
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